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Monetary Policy Under Dual Exchange Rates
ABS TRACT
This paper finds that the introduction of dual exchange rates gives the
monetary authority greater independence from external constraints than it
would otherwise enjoy. The monetary authority is able to influence the level
of aggregate demand in the short run and to sterilize the effects of temporary
foreign distrubances.In addition, the paper finds that dual rates insulate
the domestic economy fully from foreign interest rate changes but do not
provide insulation from speculative disturbances.
Robert E. Cumby
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New York University
100 Trinity Place
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(212) 285—6159In the past decade widespread use has been made of dual exchange rates, a
policy regime in which separate exchange rates are maintained for current and
capital account transactions. In many cases this regime has taken the form of
a fixed current-account rate and a floating capital-accountrate.1 In
general, dual rates have been used to provide temporary relief from balance-
of—payments pressures, especially those arising from speculative capital
flows.
Several industrialized countries implemented dual rates during the first
half of the 1970s to insulate their economies from the sizable capital
movements occurring during that period as the Bretton Woods system was
breaking down.Protection was sought both from capital inflows and from
capital outflows.France (1971-1973) and the Netherlands (197119714) are
examples of countries adopting dual rates for the first reason, while the
United Kingdom (1917_1979) adopted dual rates (applied to domestic residents
only) for the second reason.
Dual rates have also been employed recently in a number of Latin American
countries. Among these are Argentina (1981), Bolivia (1982), Mexico (1982),
and most recently, Venezuela (1983). In these cases dual rates may be useful
in providing protection from capital outflows while a viable stabilization
program is implemented and made credible.
This paper extends the early work of Argy and Porter (1972) on the effects2
of macroeconomic policies under alternative exchange—rate regimes. Argy and
Porter use a model with demand-determined output and capital mobility that
incorporates a forward exchange market.The results obtained by Argy and
Porter concerning the short-run effectiveness of monetary policy under dual
exchange rates are consIstent wIth those obtained here However, we extend
their analysis in several ways. Here, expectations are determined
endogenously, domestic prices are allowed to vary, and the role of
accumulation through the current account is highlighted. We are thereby able
to analyze both the short—run and long-run effects of various disturbances as
well as the economy's dynamic adjustment path. In addition, unlike Argy and
Porter, we emphasize the wealth effects of changes in the financial foreign
exchange rate as an important channel through which disturbances affect the
domestic economy.
Flood and Marion (1982) have also extended the Argy—Porter analysis,
though in different directions than those pursued here. They focus on the
role of optimal indexing in the determination of the aggregate supply function
under alternative exchange rate regimes. Strong results are obtained
concerning the effects of the choice of exchange-rate regime on the variation
in domestic output around Its desired level when the home country Is small in
all markets. Dual exchange rates are found to insulate the domestic economy
fully from foreign disturbances. However, they find that these conclusions do
not carry over to the case, analyzed here, in which the exports of the home3
country depend on the relative price of domestic output.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I describes themodel and
analyzes the economy's stationary equilibrium.As is the case in Flood
(1977,1978), in the absence of anticipated disturbances the adjustmentof the
economy to a stationary equilibrium ischaracterized by a current-account
surplus (deficit) and a depreciating (appreciating) capital-accountexchange
rate. Open-market policy is analyzed in Section II, where it isdemonstrated
that the authorities are able to exert long-run control over the money supply
and the domestic interest rate (though not the domestic pricelevel) even in a
world of perfect capital mobility. This non—neutrality of open—market policy
is then contrasted to the long-run neutrality results obtainedin Flood (1977)
and Argy and Porter (1972).In addition, Section II demonstrates that dual
exchange markets do not successfully insulate the economyfrom speculative
disturbances and that the relationship between the currentaccount and the
capital—account exchange rate described above isreversed when future
disturbances are anticipated.
Section III examines the effects of foreign demand disturbances.An
increase in foreign demand for home output is found to be expansionary,even
in the long run, and to result in a permanent appreciationof the current
account exchange rate. This result is similar in spirit tothe findings of
Argy and Porter although they focus on outputeffects rather than price leveleffects.The feasibility of sterilization policy is then explored. While
authorities are able temporarily to neutralize the price level effects of
external demand disturbances even in a world of perfect capital mobility, as
in Swoboda (197Z) it is found that no long-run policy of neutralization is
possible. SectIon IV offers some concluding remarks.
I. The Model
We now proceed to develop a simple model of a small, open economy under a
regime of dual exchange rates.The country is assumed to adopt a fixed
exchange rate, e, for all current-account transactions.Capital-account
transactions are assumed to be successfully segregated from current-account
transactions and occur at a freely-floating rate, .2 Both e and c are
domestic currency prices of foreign exchange.
Agents are assumed to allocate their financial wealth between domestic
money and interest-bearing assets according to the Metzler portfolio balance
rule,
(1) M/qkL(r,y), L1'zO, L2>O,
where M is the nominal money stock, r is the domestic nominal interest rate
and y is real domestic product.3 Domestic residents hold k units of the long-
lived, interest-bearing asset that has a market price of q. Equation (1)5
states that agents raise their holdings of cash balances relative to their
holdings of interest-bearing assets whenever real output rises or nominal
interest rates fall)1
All perfectly substitutable assets are assumed to be denominated in terms
of the foreIgn currency whether issued at home or abroad and pay a continuous
dividend stream of one unit of the foreign currency per unit time.The
purchase and sale of these claims occur at the financial rate, c .Interest
payments, on the other hand, occur at the commercial rate, e, since they are
current (service) account transactions. The possibility of arbitrage assures
us that all claims command the same price whether sold at home or abroad,
(2)qcq*
where q*1/r* is the foreign-currency price of the security. This condition
is then used to give us a relationship between the domestic and foreign
yields,
(3) r(e÷4e)/q(e+q*?)/cq* =(e/)r*+
wherea superscript e denotes an expected value, a dot denotes atime
derivative, and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. In obtaining (3) we
have written the domestic interest rate as the sum of dividends and expected
capital gains.56
We abstract from the banking system so that the money stock, consisting
entirely of high-powered money, is the sum of domestic credit, D, and the
domestic currency value of reserves, eR,
(1) M:D+eR.
Equilibrium in the assets market, which we assume to obtain continuously, may
then be characterized by,
(5) (D+eR)/cq*kL((e/€)r* +
Next, we consider the goods market. Wages and prices are assumed to be
fully flexible, guaranteeing that domestic output is continuously at its full-
employment level. Real aggregate spending by domestic residents (expressed in
terms of domestic output) is assumed to depend on real domestic income and on
real financial wealth,
(6)AA(yd, w/P), A1>O, A2>O,
where WD÷eR+cq*k denotes the nominal domestic-currency value of financial
wealth, P denotes the price of domestic goods, and d denotes the real
disposable income of domestic residents.Disposable income is given by the
sum of domestic product and the service account.7
yd y +er*q*k/P
Domestic residents consume both goods produced domestically and goods produced
abroad. Domestic and foreign output are imperfect substitutes In consumption
so that purchasing power parity does not hold. The fraction, e,of domestic
expenditure falling on domestic goods depends on their relative price.We
assume the home country to be small in the market for foreign outputand takes
foreign prices as given (ee(e/P),8?>O).6 However the home country is
assumed to be large in the market for its output so that home country exports
depend on their relative price (XX(e/P), X'>O).Equilibrium in the market
for domestic goods is given by the equality of aggregate demand for domestic
output and its fixed, full-employment supply,
(8) y =e(e/P)A(y+er*q*k/P,WI?) +X(e/P).
Domestic prices are fully flexible and adjust so that the goods-market
equilibrium (8) holds at each moment. This implies that the equilibrium price
level can be written as a function of the determinants of aggregate demand,
(9) P =P(c,R;D,e,r*,k), P1>O, P2>O.
An increase In either or R will raise the domestic currency value of
financial wealth, thereby raising demand for domestic output. An increase in
prices is required to restore goods-market equilibrium by switching8
expenditure away from domestic goods and by reducing the real value of both
wealth and service account income.
Short-run equilibrium In the economy is characterized by the simultaneous
clearing of the goods market and the assets market. Long-run equilibrium also
requires balance-of-payments equilibrium.The combination of dual exchange
rates and a floating capital—account rate imply that the capital account is
always zero. Therefore, reserves change over time at the rate of the current-
account imbalance as the central bank intervenes to keep the commercial rate,
e, fixed,
(10) R (P/e)((e(e/P)_1)A(y+er*q*k/P, W/P)+X(e/P))+r*q*k.
By noting that the equilibrium price level depends on the determinants of
aggregate demand, we can combine (9) and (10) to describe the rate of reserve
growth as,
(11)Rg(e,R;D,e,r*,k),g1<O, g2<O.
An increase in either or R raises wealth and therefore raises domestic
spending and worsens the current account. On the other hand, an increase in
domestic prices also results from increases in e and H. The expenditure-
switching effect of the price increase tends to worsen the current account
while the reduction in the real value of interest income and financial wealth9
tends to improve the current account. It is possible to demonstrate, however,
that the direct wealth effect dominates the indirect, price level effect.
Equation (11) is one of the equations of motion that wewill use to
analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy. In order to completethe model
we need to describe the behavior of' the financial rate, E. Wedo so by
making the strong assumption that agents posses perfect foresight so that,
(12) e
Next we use the money market equilibrium condition, (5), together with the
perfect foresight assumption, (12), to describe the movementof the financial
rate consistent with equilibrium in the assets market,
(13) h(€,R;D,e,r*,k) h1>O, h2<O.
An increase in the financial rate generates an excess demand for money through
two channels.First, it raises the domestic—currency value of interest
bearing assets.Second, it reduces the yield domestic investors receive.
Money-market equilibrium then requires an increase in the rate of depreciation
of the financial rate, which raises the domestic interest rate and therefore
reduces money demand.Similarly an increase in reserves creates an excess
supply of' money and must be associated with a decreasein the rate of
depreciation of the financial rate to insure that money markets clear.10
Taken together (11) and (13) describe the dynamic path followed by the
economy, given the stock of domestic credit, the commercial rate, the foreign
interest rate, and stock of interest-bearing assets held by the private
sector.We now proceed to analyze the local stability properties of the
economyinthe neIghborhood of a statIonary state. In the course of doing so
wewilldevelop the system's phase diagram, which will prove useful in
analyzing the economy's adjustment to various shocks. Linearizing the system,




Thesystem's determinant, h1g2 —g1h2,is negative implying that the system
hasone positive and one negative characteristic root. The system therefore
exhibits saddle-point stability, a property common in rational-expectations
and perfect-foresight models.
Figure 1
The phase diagram of the linearized dynamic system, (14), is found in figure
1.The 0 locus depicts the values of reserves and the financial rate
consistent with assets market equilibrium and a stationary financial rate. It
Is positively sloped since, as was noted above, increases in reserves generate











excess demand for money.7 The R=O locus depicts the values of reserves and the
financial rate consistent with equilibrium in the goods market and with a
balanced current account.It slopes downward since, as was discussed above,
increases in reserves and the financial rate both tend to worsen the current
account through their effect on domestic wealth.8 The stable arm of the
saddle-point equilibrium is labelled SS in figure 1.We follow standard
practice and assume that in the absence of anticipated disturbances adjustment
occurs along the convergent path, SS. Consider the adjustment from a point
like C on 35 to the steady-state equilibrium, E. As reserves decline the
resulting contraction of' the monetary base creates an incipient excess supply
of foreign exchange and therefore a fully-anticipated appreciation of the
financial rate.Both the decline in reserves and the appreciation of the
financial rate reduce spending over time and therefore reduce the size of' the
current—account deficit. The adjustment path is characterized by a current-
account deficit and an appreciating capital—account exchange rate.It is of
interest to note that this is the opposite relationship from that obtained by
Kouri (1976)andby Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) for the case of flexible
rates.This difference is due to the fact that, under flexible rates, as
agents rebalance their portfolios in response to current-account surpluses an
excess demand for money results since the accumulation occurs in the form of
foreign assets.Here, accumulation of wealth occurs in the form of cash
balances, resulting in an excess supply of money.912
II. Open-Market Policy and Monetary Disturbances
In this section we analyze the short-run and long-run effects of an
unanticipated open-market purchase of securities by the central bank. We then
turn to the effects of a "speculative attack" on the home currency.The
effect of an open-market purchase is depicted in figure 2. Suppose a long-run
equilibrium, such as E, is disturbed by a central bank purchase of interest-
bearing assets.1° Since the value of the increase in the stock of domestic
credit is equal to the value of securities purchased, private financial wealth
is unchanged at the initial equilibrium.The current account therefore
remains balanced at all points along R0.11 However, due to the change in
relative asset supplies there is now an excess supply of money at all points
on the -O locus. At each level of' reserves a higher value of the capital-
account rate is needed to restore money—market equilibrium. The c 0 locus
therefore shifts up and to the left to 'O.
Figure 2
At the time of the purchase the incipient excess demand for foreign exchange
at E causes an immediate depreciation of the financial rate and short—run
equilibrium is reached at E' on 5'S'. There is no immediate change in R as
dual exchange markets prevent a net outflow of private capital and the
financial rate overshoots its new long—run value.The wealth effect of the





deficit. Over time, reserves decline and the financial rateappreciates.12
Theincreasein aggregate demand resulting from the monetary expansion
results in an immediate increase in domestic prices.This price increase
serves to dampen the real wealth effect of the depreciationof the financial
rate and to switch demand away from domestic goods.Adjustment to the new
long—run equilibrium occurs with a falling stockof reserves and an
appreciating capital-account rate. The associated declinein wealth reduces
absorption and therefore reduces domestic prices over time.The price decline
continues until the original domestic price level is restored at E". Monetary
policy is therefore able to influence domestic pricesin the short run but not
in the long run.
The inability of the central bank to influence the price level in the long
run is not due to an inability to control the money stock.As can be seen in
figure 2, the new long-run equilibrium, E", is characterized by ahigher value
of the financial rate. The higher financial rate implies that thedomestic
interest rate must be lower at E" than at E. With real output unchanged,
assets-market equilibrium requires that a lower domestic interestrate be
accompanied by a larger monetary base. The long-run reserveloss following an
open-market purchase is therefore less than one for one.
The nonzero long-run effect of a monetary expansion on thedomesticinterest rate and money stock differs from that obtained in models adopting
the monetary approach to the balance of payments.13 In these models a monetary
expansion results In a current—account deficit that offsets the expansion over
time. In the long run the offset is complete. This difference is due to the
assumption in monetary approach models that agents hold only one asset,
money. All monetary operations are therefore of Metzler's second type,
changes in the money supply "...without any offsetting changes in private
holdings of other assets."15 The results also stand in contrast to the long-
run neutrality of money with dual exchange rates found in Flood (1977) and
Argy and Porter (1972). The reason for the difference is that these authors
look at type II money supply changes while here we analyze the effect of open-
market operations in which money Is exchanged for financial assets of equal
value. As is well known, neutrality propositions derived from the analysis of
type II monetary operations do not carry over to the analysis of typeI (open
market) operations.
16
In the current context of endogenously—determined expectations it is
inappropriate to model a speculative disturbance as an exogenous change in
expectations about the financial rate. Instead, we model a speculative attack
as a change in agents' expectations concerning future policy to be pursued by
the domestic monetary authority.In particular, we suppose that at time t0
the economy is disturbed by agents' expectation that, at some time t1 in the
future, the domestic monetary authority will engage in an open-market15
expansion of the money stock.
The effect of this speculative disturbance is found in figure 3. At t1
agents expect the economy will be on S'S', the stable armassociated with a
higher stock of domestic credit. Adjustment from t1 will proceed exactly as
analyzed in the case of an unantcpated open-market purchase. Furthermore,
all discrete jumps in the financial rate must be unanticipated. Any
anticipated discrete jumps would imply anticipated capital gains on foreign
assets at an infinite instantaneous rate that would be bid away.At t0 the
economy jumps to a point, E', as the expected future monetaryease creates an
incipient excess demand for foreign exchange and resultsin an immediate
depreciation of the financial rate.The wealth effect of the depreciation
raises aggregate demand and results in an increase in domestic prices.The
increase in spending also results in a current- account deficit and a lossof
reserves. A current-account deficit is associated with a depreciating
financial rate and rising prices as the economy responds to the expected
future monetary expansion.
Figure 3
If the monetary authority does indeed engage in an open-market expansionof
the money stock at t1, adjustment continues with a continuingcurrent-account
deficit and an appreciating financial rate until the new long-run equilibrium




























in the money stock occurs agents must revise their expectations. Suppose that
this revision occurs sometime prior to t1 and that agents now correctly
perceive that the monetary authority plans to keep the stock of domestic
credit unchanged.The financial rate must immediately appreciate and the
economy jumps vertically to a point on 88, the stable branch associatedwith
the original stock of domestic credit. The capital loss that results from the
appreciation reduces absorption and prices. A current-account surplus results
as the economy begins to accumulate reserves and the financial rate
depreciates until the initial long-run equilibrium, E, is restored.
Dual exchange markets are therefore not successful in insulating either
the current account or domestic prices from speculativedisturbances.17 The
connection between the speculative disturbance and the current account and
prices is through the wealth effect of the financial rate on spending.
Before turning to the effects of demand disturbances we briefly analyze
the effect of an increase in the foreign interest rate.18 First consider the
assets market.An increase in the foreign interest rate creates an excess
supply of money at the initial equilibrium both by raising the domestic
interest rate and by reducing the value of financial wealth (recall q*1Ir*).
The financial rate is therefore bid up as agents attempt to raise their
holdings of interest-bearing assets.A depreciation of the financial rate
proportional to the increase in the foreign interest rate will restore17
equilibrium in the assets market since both the initial domesticinterest rate
and the initial value of wealth will be restored. A proportional depreciation
of the financial rate will also bring about current-account balance since both
wealth and the service account will then be unchanged. Dual rates therefore
completely insulate the domestic price level and the currentaccount from
changes in foreign Interest rates.19
III. Demand Disturbances and Internal Balance
In this section we examine the effects of an unanticipated exogenous
increase in export demand andthenexamine the feasibility of using monetary
policy to pursue an internal balance goal in the faceof this external
disturbance.2° It will be seen that an external demand disturbance will
permanently alter domestic prices and that the domestic monetary authority may
temporarily neutralize the pricelevel effects of external demand
disturbances, even in world of perfect capital mobility. An attemptto use
monetary policy to maintain an internal-balance goal in theface of permanent
external disturbance is ultimately self-defeating.
The effect of an unanticipated increase in export demand is foundin
figure 14 The increase in export demand creates acurrent-account surplus at
the Initial equilibrium and a higher financial rate or a higherstock of
reserves is needed to raise wealth and, therefore, increase aggregatedemand
and domestic prices to restore external balance.The R=O locus therefore18
shifts up and to the right.The increase in foreign demand has no direct
effect on assets markets so that all points on the original-O locus remain
consistent with assets—market equilibrium and a stationaryfinancial rate.
Figure
Following the foreign demand shock the currentaccount moves into surplus.
The resulting growth in reserves raises the domestic money stock,requiring a
depreciating financial rate to clear the assetsmarket. The expectation of a
depreciating financial rate raises the domesticinterest rate. Since
initially the domestic money supply is unchanged,the rise in the domestic
interest rate creates an incipient excess supply of money(excess demand for
foreign exchange) that must be removed by aninitial upward jump in the
financial rate.The combination of accumulating reserves and a rising
exchange rate imply that domestic prices are rising alongthe adjustment path,
reducing the current-account surplus over time.The new long-run equilibrium
is characterized by a permanently higher price level and an appreciatedreal
commercial exchange rate that serves to switch expenditure awayfrom domestic
goods.
Suppose the monetary authority attemptsto resist the inflationary
pressure resulting from the foreigndemand shock.By adopting an internal
balance goal of price stability the monetary authority,in effect, makes the





To aid in the analysis we introduce an internal balance locus, labelled P0P0
in figure 5. If prices are held at their initial level, absorption becomes a
function of the level of wealth only.For a given level of export demand
internal balance therefore requires that wealth be constant. The slope of the
internal balance schedule is then,
(15) d -- e
dR P0P0 q*k
At the initial equilibrium, E, the expansionary effect of the increase in
export demand raises prices above P0. A decrease in c or in R is requiredto
reduce domestic spending and restore internal balance. The internal balance
schedule shifts down and to the left to P0'P0'. Since prices are now higher
than P0 the monetary authority must engage in an open-market sale of
securities. This contraction in the money stock leads to an appreciation of
the financial rate and the economy jumps to A, the only point on the saddle
path S'S' associated with the newly reduced money supplythat also satisfies
the internal balance condition. The expenditure—reducing impact of the open-
market sale increases the current-account surplus above that resulting from
the export expansion alone.The central bank must sterilize these inflows
through further open-market sales to maintain internal balance.During the








Two questions naturally arise.First, is sterilization more or less than
complete? Second, is the use of monetary policy tomaintain internal balance
a feasible long-run policy? Since open-marketsales are being used to keep
wealth constant, movement along P01P0' is characterized by aconstant rate of
appreciation
(16) _(e/q*k)R
and the domestic interest rate must therefore be rising as cfalls. A rising
domestic interest rate is consistent with money-market equilibriumonly if the
money stock is falling. Sterilizationmust therefore be more than complete
and the rate of decline in the stock of domesticcredit must exceed the rate
of reserve accumulation.
The question of the long-run feasibility of theinternal-balance target
depends on whether the current account surplus canbe eliminated over time and
a new long-run equilibrium establishedwith P=P0.So long as the monetary
authority maintains its internal balance goal,the rate of reserve
accumulation is given by,
(17) R




Since wealth is being held constant, the inflow of reserves is unabated by
sterilization and the central bank will eventually deplete its holdings of
interestbearing assets.21 WhIle successful In sustaInIng P0 as a temporary
equilibrium, the central bank only changes the composition of its balance
sheet in the long run.Monetary policy alone Is incapable of achieving an
Internal-balance goal In the face of an external demand disturbance.The
contribution of dual exchange markets is to allow short-run internal-balance
goals to be achieved in a world of perfect capital mobility.22
IV. Concluding Remarks
The adoption of a two—tier exchange-rate regime gives the monetary
authority greater independence from external constraints than it would
otherwise enjoy.If the authorities are successful in forcing only and all
capital-account transactions through the financial exchange market, the
capital account is zero in the absence of intervention in that market. When
the current-account rate is pegged reserve losses are limited to those
resulting from current-account Imbalances.The possibility of central bank
control over the money stock then arises.This control may be used to
influence the level of aggregate demand in the short run and to sterilize22
temporarily the effects of foreign disturbances.It should noted, however,
that these results are derived in an idealized setting thatabstracts from
important practical problems such as incomplete segmentationthat are
frequently encountered in implementing dual exchange rates.
By lImItIng reserve losses to current—account imbalances adual exchange
rate regime is in some respects similar to a fixed exchange rate regimein the
absence of capital mobility. In another Important respect, however,the two
regimes are very different. The financial foreign exchangerate provides an
important link between the domestic economy and foreigndisturbances that is
absent when capital is immobile.23
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sector.We assume that the interest payments the central bank gains by the
purchase are redistributed to the private sector as lump-sum transfer payments
so disposable income is unchanged.
l2 is interesting to note that since the expected appreciation of the
financial rate reduces the domestic interest rate a smaller initial
depreciation (and, therefore, a smaller degree of overshooting) is needed to
restore short-run equilibrium than would be the case if expectations were
static.In the case of static expectations the economy jumps to a point on
=O vertically above E.
13See for example Dornbusch (197Lt).
1The importance of the one-asset assumption in monetary-approach models
of the effects of devaluation is examined in Obstfeld (1981).
5See Metzler (1951,p.97).
6The distinction between the two types of monetary operations depends on30
the assumptions made about the public's treatment of incomestreams resulting
from the central bank's holdings of interest-bearing assets.See Obstfeld
(1982) for a discussion of this point.
7This result differs from the conclusions reached in Swoboda (1974) and
Dornbusch (1976) due to their assumptIon that changes In thefinancial rate
have no effect on absorption. Here wealth effects play acentral role.
l8Since the foreign price level is being held constant while the foreign
interest rate is rising, the shock we are analyzingmust be due to a
combination of disturbances to the foreign goods market andthe foreign assets
market that leaves aggregate demand for foreign goods,and therefore the
foreign price level, unchanged.An advantage of the extended small country
analysis employed by Flood (1979) and Flood andMarion (1982) is that the
analysis focuses directly on the source of disturbances.
9Argy and Porter (197k) and Marion (1981) also find that dualrates
insulate the domestic economy from changes in the foreigninterest rate. As
is apparent from the discussion above, Marion's assumptionthat domestic and
foreign assets are imperfect substitutes isnot essential to her results.
However, as Marion points out, the assumptionthat domestic residents hold
consuls rather that short term foreign assets is crucialto the result. Flood
and Marion (1982) use an extended small country analysisand therefore do not
analyze the effects of foreign interestrate disturbances.Instead, they31
focus on shocks to foreign productivity and to the foreign money supply.
20The internal balance goal is assumed to be a domestic price level
target.This use of' the term differs from Meade's (1951,p.lO) use of the
term to refer to a domestic employment target.
similar approach Is followed by Obstfeld (1980) who examines the
behavior of dR/dR.
22Swoboda (19V4) reaches similar conclusions concerning the long-run
viability of sterilization.